The RAIN project is a research collaboration between Caltech and NASA-JPL on distributed computing and data storage systems for future spaceborne missions. The goal of the project is to identify and develop key building blocks for reliable distributed systems built with inexpensive o -the-shelf components. The RAIN platform consists of a heterogeneous cluster of computing and/or storage nodes connected via multiple interfaces to networks con gured in fault-tolerant topologies. The RAIN software components run in conjunction with operating system services and standard network protocols. Through software-implemented fault tolerance, the system tolerates multiple node, link, and switch failures, with no single point of failure. In this paper we describe the following contributions: 1) fault-tolerant interconnect topologies and communication protocols providing consistent error reporting of link failures; 2) fault management techniques based on group membership; and 3) data storage schemes based on computationally e cient error-control codes. We present several proof-of-concept applications: highly available video and web servers, and a distributed checkpointing system.
Introduction
The Reliable Array of Independent Nodes (RAIN) project is a research collaboration between Caltech's Parallel and Distributed Computing Group and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Center for Integrated Space Microsystems, in the area of distributed computing and data storage systems for future spaceborne missions. The goal of the project is to identify and develop key building blocks for reliable distributed systems built with inexpensive o -the-shelf components. The RAIN platform consists of a heterogeneous cluster of computing and/or storage nodes connected via multiple interfaces to networks con gured in fault-tolerant topologies. The RAIN software components run in conjunction with operating system services and standard network protocols such as TCP/IP, ATM, and Ethernet, as shown in Figure 1 . Features of the RAIN system include scalability, dynamic recon gurability, and high availability. Through software-implemented fault tolerance, the system tolerates multiple node, link, and switch failures, with no single point of failure. In addition to reliability, the RAIN architecture permits e cient use of network resources, such as multiple data paths and redundant storage, with graceful degradation in the presence of faults. A diagram of the RAIN testbed at Caltech is shown in Figure 2 . We have 10 Intel Pentium workstations running the Linux operating system, each with two network interfaces. These are connected via four eight-way Myrinet switches 11].
We have identi ed the following key building blocks for distributed computing systems.
Communication: Fault-tolerant interconnect topologies and reliable communication protocols. We describe network topologies that are resistant to partitioning, and a protocol guaranteeing a consistent history of link failures. Fault Management: Techniques based on group membership. We describe an e cient tokenbased protocol that tolerates node and link failures. Storage: Distributed data storage schemes based on error-control codes. We describe schemes that are optimal in terms of storage as well as encoding/decoding complexity. We present three proof-of-concept applications based on the RAIN building blocks:
A video server based on the RAIN communication and data storage components. 
Related Work
Cluster computing systems such as the NOW project at the University of California, Berkeley { Fault-tolerant interconnect topologies: Network partitioning is always a problem when a cluster of computers must act as a whole. We provide work on network topologies that are resistant to partitioning as network elements fail.
Group membership: A fundamental part of fault management is identifying which nodes are healthy and participating in the cluster. We give a new protocol for establishing group membership.
Data Storage: Error-correcting codes have been developed for reliable storage of data over multiple disks. These are array codes that encode and decode using simple XOR operations. These codes can be thought of as a data partitioning scheme that allows one to trade o storage requirements for fault tolerance. Traditional RAID codes essentially only give you mirroring or parity (one degree of fault tolerance) as options. These codes exhibit optimality in the storage requirements and in the number of update operations needed. Although some of the original motivation for these codes came from traditional RAID systems, these schemes apply equally well to partitioning data over disks on distinct nodes (as in our project) or even partitioning data over disks at remote geographic locations.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss fault-tolerant interconnect topologies and the communication protocol. In Section 3, we present the group membership protocol. In Section 4, we discuss error-control codes and reliable storage. In Section 5, we describe applications built with the RAIN software components. In Section 6, we present conclusions and directions of future work.
Communication
Since the network is frequently a single point of failure, RAIN addresses fault tolerance in the network with fault-tolerant interconnect topologies and with bundled network interfaces.
Fault-Tolerant Interconnect Topologies
We were faced with the question of how to connect compute nodes to switching networks to maximize the network's resistance to partitioning. Many distributed computing algorithms face trouble when presented with a large set of nodes that have become partitioned from the others. A network that is resistant to partitioning should lose only some constant number of nodes (with respect to the total number of nodes) given that we do not exceed some number of failures. After additional failures we may see partitioning of the set of compute nodes, i.e., some fraction of the total number of compute nodes may be lost. By carefully choosing how we connect our compute nodes to the switches, we can maximize a system's ability to resist partitioning in the presence of faults.
Our main contributions are: (i) a construction for degree-2 compute nodes connected by a ring network of switches of degree 4 that can tolerate any 3 switch failures without partitioning the nodes into disjoint sets, (ii) a proof that this construction is optimal in the sense that no construction can tolerate more switch failures while avoiding partitioning, and (iii) generalizations of this construction to arbitrary switch and node degrees and to other switch networks, in particular, to a fully-connected network of switches.
See 34] for our full paper on the work described in this section.
Previous Fault-Tolerant Interconnect Work
The construction of fault-tolerant networks was studied in 1976 by Hayes 31] . This paper looked primarily at constructing graphs that would still contain some target graph as a subgraph even after the introduction of some number of faults. For example, a construction of k-FT rings that would still contain a ring of the given size after the introduction of k faults was explored.
Other papers that address the construction of fault-tolerant networks are 15] for fault-tolerant rings, meshes, and hypercubes, 12, 13, 14] for rings and other circulants, and 21, 22, 23] for trees and other fault-tolerant systems.
A recent paper by Ku and Hayes 33] looks at an issue similar to the one covered in this paper. In particular, it discusses maintaining connectivity among compute nodes connected by buses. This is equivalent to not permitting any switch-to-switch connections in our model. We are looking at permitting such switch-to-switch connections to allow the creation of useful switch topologies and then connecting compute nodes to this network of switches.
The Problem
We look at the following problem: Given n switches of degree d s connected in a ring, what is the best way to connect n compute nodes of degree d c to the switches to minimize the possibility of partitioning the compute nodes when switch failures occur? Figure 3 illustrates the problem. 
A Na ve Approach
At a rst glance, Figure 4a may seem a solution to our problem. In this construction we simply connect the compute nodes to the nearest switches in a regular fashion. If we use this approach, we are relying entirely on fault tolerance in the switching network. A ring is 1-fault-tolerant for connectivity, so we can lose one switch without upset. A second switch failure can partition the switches and thus the compute nodes, as in Figure 4b . This prompts the study of whether we can use the multiple connections of the compute nodes to make the compute nodes more resistant to partitioning. In other words, we want a construction where the connectivity of the nodes is maintained even after the switch network has become partitioned. 
Diameter Construction d c = 2
The intuitive, driving idea behind this construction is to connect the compute nodes to the switching network in the most non-local way possible. That is, connect a compute node to switches that are maximally distant from each other. This idea can be applied to arbitrary compute node degree d c ,
where each connection for a node is as far apart as possible from its neighbors. We call this the diameter solution because the maximally distant switches in a ring are on opposite sides of the ring, so a compute node of degree 2 connected between them forms a diameter.
We actually use the switches that are one less than the diameter apart to permit n compute nodes to be connected to n switches with each compute node connected to a unique pair of switches. Note: Although Construction 2.1 is given for an identical number of compute nodes and switches, we can add additional compute nodes by repeating the above process. In this case, we would connect node c j to the same switches as node c j mod n . All the following results still hold, with a simple change in constants. For example, when we connect 10 nodes to 10 switches we have a maximum loss of 6 nodes at 3 faults. Increasing the number of nodes to 3n = 30 triples the maximum nodes lost at 3 faults to 18. This is also true of the generalized diameters construction in 34]. The maximum number of lost nodes is still constant with respect to n, the number of switches. The addition of extra nodes to the ring constructions a ects only this constant in our claims. The asymptotic results about resistance to partitioning are all still valid. Theorem 2.1 Construction 2.1 creates a graph of n compute nodes of degree d c = 2 connected to a ring of n switches of degree d s = 4 that can tolerate 3 faults of any kind (switch, link, or node) without partitioning the network. Thus, only a constant number of nodes (with respect to n) will be lost. In this case that constant is min(n; 6) lost nodes. This construction is optimal in the sense that no construction connecting n compute nodes of degree d c = 2 to a ring of switches of degree d s = 4 can tolerate an arbitrary 4 faults without partitioning the nodes into sets of non-constant size (with respect to n).
The proof of this theorem is given in 34]. The latter paper also presents a generalization to nodes of degree larger than two, as well as a clique network instead of the ring shown above.
Consistent-History Protocol for Link Failures
Once we bundle interfaces together on a machine and allow links and network adapters to fail, we must monitor available paths in the network for proper functioning. In 34] we give a modi ed ping protocol that guarantees that each side of the communication channel sees the same history. Each side is limited in how much it may lead or lag the other side of the channel, giving the protocol bounded slack. This notion of identical history can be useful in the development of applications using this connectivity information. For example, if an application takes error recovery action in the event of lost connectivity, it knows that both sides of the channel will see the exact same behavior on the channel over time, and will thus take the same error recovery action. Such a guarantee may simplify the writing of applications using this connectivity information.
Our main contributions are: (i) a simple, stable protocol for monitoring connectivity that maintains a consistent history with bounded slack, and (ii) proofs that this protocol exhibits correctness, bounded slack, and stability.
See 35] for our full paper on the work described in this section.
Previous Link-State Work
Although this is not the consensus problem, it is still useful to look at past work on consensus, such as Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson in 28], or in Lynch's book 36]. The connectivity problem has been addressed with di erent goals by Rodehe er and Schroeder in the Autonet system 41, 42] . They were concerned with adaptive rates and skepticism in judging the quality of a link, whereas we are concerned with consistency in reporting the quality of a link. Birman 8] gives general motivation for consistency in failure reporting for the purpose of improving reliability of distributed systems.
Precise Problem De nition
We now present all the requirements of the protocol:
Correctness: The protocol will eventually correctly re ect the true state of the channel. If the channel ceases to perform bi-directional communication (at least one side sees timeouts), both sides should eventually mark the channel as Down. If the channel resumes bi-directional communication, both sides should eventually mark the channel as Up.
Bounded Slack: The protocol will ensure a maximum slack of N exists between the two sides. Neither side will be allowed to lag or lead the other by more than N transitions.
Stability: Each real channel event (i.e., timeout) will cause at most some bounded number of observable state transitions, preferably one, at each endpoint.
The system model is one in which nodes do not fail, but links intermittently fail. The links must be such that a sliding window protocol can function. See the discussion on data link protocols by Lynch in 36].
The Protocol
This protocol uses reliable message passing to ensure that nodes on opposing ends of some faulty channel see the same state history of link failure and recovery. The reliable message passing can be implemented using a sliding window protocol, as mentioned above. At rst it may seem odd to discuss monitoring the status of a link using reliable messages. However, it makes the description and proof of the protocol easier, preventing us from essentially re-proving sliding window protocols in a di erent form. For actual implementations, there is no reason to build the protocol on an existing reliable communication layer. The protocol can be easily implemented on top of ping messages (sent unreliably) with only a sequence number and acknowledge number as data (in other words, we can easily map reliable messaging on top of the ping messages).
The protocol consists of two parts:
First, we send and receive tokens using reliable messaging. Tokens are conserved, neither lost nor duplicated. Tokens are sent whenever a side sees an observable channel state transition. The observable channel state is whether the link is seen as Up or Down. The token-passing part of the protocol essentially is the protocol. Its job is to ensure that a consistent history is maintained.
Second, we send and receive ping messages using unreliable messaging. The sole purpose of the pings is to detect when the link can be considered Up or Down. This part of the protocol would not necessarily have to be implemented with pings, but could be done using other hints from the underlying system. For example, hardware could give instant feedback about its view of link status. For all the proofs to be valid, we must have that a t out is generated when bi-directional communication has (probably) been lost, and a t in is generated when bi-directional communication has (probably) been re-established.
The token-passing part of the protocol maintains the consistent history between the sides, and the pings give information on the current channel state. The token-passing protocol can be seen as a lter that takes raw information about the channel and produces channel information guaranteed to be (eventually) consistent at both ends of the channel.
For the actual protocol and proofs of correctness, bounded slack, and stability, see 35].
Group Membership
Tolerating faults in an asynchronous distributed system is a challenging task. In order for a distributed application to work correctly in the presence of faults, a certain level of agreement among the non-faulty processes must be achieved. There are a number of well-de ned problems in an asynchronous distributed system, such as consensus, group membership, commit, and atomic broadcast that have been extensively studied by researchers. In the RAIN system, the group membership protocol is a critical building block. A reliable group membership service ensures that the processes in a group maintain a consistent view of the global membership. It is a di cult task, especially when a change in the membership occurs, either due to failures or to voluntary joins and withdrawals. In fact, under the classical asynchronous environment, the group membership problem has been proven impossible to solve in the presence of any failures 28], 16]. The underlying reason for the impossibility is that according to the classical de nition of an asynchronous environment, processes in the system share no common clock and there is no bound on the message delay. Under this de nition, it is impossible to implement a reliable fault detector, for it cannot distinguish between a crashed node and a very slow node. Since the establishment of this important theoretic result, researchers have been striving to circumvent this impossibility. Theorists have modi ed the speci cations 6], 17], 39], while practitioners have built a number of real systems that achieve a level of reliability in their particular environment 7], 1].
In this section, we describe a fault management service used in the RAIN system. To circumvent the impossibility result, we have made the assumption that the mean time to failure of the system is greater than the convergence time of our protocol. Under this assumption, this service tolerates both permanent and transient node and link failures. This service exhibits the bene ts of low overhead, self-correction and dynamic scalability.
The key to this fault management service is a token-based group membership protocol. The protocol consists of two mechanisms, a token mechanism and a 911 mechanism. The two mechanisms are described in greater detail in the next two sections.
The Token Mechanism
The nodes in the membership are ordered in a logical ring. A token is a message that is being passed at a regular interval from one node to the next node in the ring. The reliable packet communication layer is used for the transmission of the token, and guarantees that the token will eventually reach the destination. The token carries the authoritative knowledge of the membership. When a node receives a token, it updates its local membership information according to the token.
The token is also used for failure detection. There are two variants of the failure detection protocol in this token mechanism. The aggressive detection protocol achieves fast detection time, but is more prone to incorrect decisions, namely, it may temporarily exclude a partially disconnected node in the presence of link failures. The conservative detection protocol excludes a node only when its communication has failed from all nodes in the connected component. The conservative detection protocol has a slower failure detection time. 
Aggressive Failure Detection
When the aggressive failure detection protocol is used, after a node fails to send a token to the next node, the former node immediately decides that the latter node has failed or disconnected, and removes that node from the membership. The node updates the token with the adjusted membership information, and passes the token to the next live node in the ring. This protocol does not guarantee that all nodes in the connected component are included in the membership at all times. If a node loses a connection to part of the system because of a link failure, it could be excluded from the membership. The excluded node will automatically rejoin the system, however, via the 911 mechanism, which we will describe in the next section. For example, for the situation in Figure 6 (b), the link between A and B is broken. After node A fails to send the token to node B, the aggressive failure detection protocol excludes node B from the membership. The ring changes from ABCD to ACD until node B rejoins the membership when the 911 mechanism is activated.
Conservative Failure Detection
In comparison, when the conservative failure detection protocol is used, partially disconnected nodes will not be excluded. When a node detects that another node is not responding, the former node does not remove the latter node from the membership. Instead, it changes the order of the ring. In the example in Figure 6 (c), after node A fails to send the token to node B, it changes the ring from ABCD to ACBD. Node A then sends the token to node C, and node C to node B. In the case when a node is indeed broken, all the nodes in the connected component fail to send the token to this node. When a node fails to send a token to another node twice in a row, it removes that node from the membership.
Uniqueness of Token
The token mechanism is the basic component of the membership protocol. It guarantees that there exists no more than one token in the system at any one time. This single token detects the failures, records the membership, and updates all live nodes as it travels around the ring. After a failed node is determined, all live nodes in the membership are unambiguously informed within one round of token travel. Group membership consensus is therefore achieved.
911 Mechanism
Having described the token mechanism, a few questions remain. What if a node fails when it possesses the token and consequently the token is lost? Is it possible to add a new node to the system? How does the system recover from a transient failure? All of these questions can be answered by the 911 mechanism.
Token Regeneration
To deal with the token loss problem, a timeout has been set on each node in the membership. If a node does not receive a token for a certain period of time, it enters the STARVING mode. The node suspects that the token has been lost and sends out a 911 message to the next node in the ring. The 911 message is a request for the right to regenerate the token, and is to be approved by all the live nodes in the membership. It is imperative to allow one and only one node to regenerate the token when a token regeneration is needed. To guarantee this mutual exclusivity we utilize the sequence number on the token. Every time a token is being passed from one node to another, the sequence number on it is increased by one. The primary function of the sequence number is to allow the receiving node to discard out-of-sequence tokens. The sequence number also plays an important role in the token regeneration mechanism. Each node makes a local copy of the token every time that the node receives it. When a node needs to send a 911 message to request the regeneration of the token, it adds this message to the sequence number that is on its last local copy of the token. This sequence number will be compared to all the sequence numbers on the local copies of the token on the other live nodes. The 911 request will be denied by any node which possesses a more recent copy of the token. In the event that the token is lost, every live node sends out a 911 request after its STARVING timeout expires. Only the node with the latest copy of the token will receive the right to regenerate the token.
Dynamic Scalability
The 911 message is not only used as a token regeneration request, but also as a request to join the group. When a new node wishes to participate in the membership, it sends a 911 message to any node in the cluster. The receiving node notices that the originating node of this 911 is not a member of the distributed system, and therefore treats it as a join request. The next time that it receives the token, it adds the new node to the membership, and sends the token to the new node. The new node becomes a part of the system.
Link Failures and Transient Failures
The uni cation of the token regeneration request and the join request facilitates the treatment of the link failures in the aggressive failure detection protocol. Using the example in Figure 6 (b), node B has been removed from the membership because of the link failure between A and B. Node B does not receive the token for awhile and it enters the STARVING mode and sends out a 911 message to node C. Node C notices that node B is not part of the membership and therefore treats the 911 as a join request. The ring is changed to ACBD and node B joins the membership.
Transient failures are treated with the same mechanism. When a transient failure occurs, a node is removed from the membership. After that node recovers, it sends out a 911 message. The 911 message is treated as a join request, and the node is added back into the cluster. In the same fashion, wrong decisions made in a local failure detector can also be corrected, guaranteeing that all non-faulty nodes in the primary connected component eventually stay in the primary membership.
Putting together the token and 911 mechanisms, we have a reliable group membership protocol. Using this protocol, it is easy to build the fault management service. It is also possible to attach to the token application-dependent synchronization information. For example, in the SNOW project described in Section 5.2, the HTTP request queue is attached to the token to ensure mutual exclusion of service.
Data Storage
Much research has been done on improving reliability by introducing data redundancy (also called information dispersity) 32], 46]. The RAIN system provides a distributed storage system based on a class of error-control codes called array codes. In Section 4.2, we describe the implementation of distributed store and retrieve operations based upon this storage scheme.
Array Codes
Array codes are a class of error-control codes that are particularly well-suited to be used as erasurecorrecting codes. Erasure-correcting codes are a mathematical means of representing data so that lost information can be recovered. With an (n; k) erasure-correcting code, we represent k symbols of the original data with n symbols of encoded data (n ? The complexity of the computations needed to construct the encoded data (a process called encoding) and to recover the original data (a process called decoding) is an important consideration for practical systems. Array codes are ideal in this respect 10], 27]. The only operations needed for encoding and decoding are simple binary exclusive-or (XOR) operations, which can be implemented e ciently in hardware and/or software. Several MDS array codes are known. For example, the EVENODD code 9] is a general (n; k) array code. Recently, we described two classes of (n; n ? 2) and (n; 2) MDS array codes with an optimal number of encoding and decoding operations 51], 53]. Table 1 Table 1 , the data is encoded as follows: Notice that the amount of data needed for decoding (4 columns with 3 bits each) equals the amount of original data (12 bits). Thus, the code is MDS. Decoding can be performed with simple XOR operations. An explicit algorithm is given in 53].
Distributed Store/Retrieve Operations
Our distributed store and retrieve operations are a straight-forward application of MDS array codes to distributed storage. Suppose that we have n nodes. For a store operation, we encode a block of data of size d into n symbols, each of size d k , using an (n; k) MDS array code. We store one symbol per node. For a retrieve operation, we collect the symbols from any k nodes, and decode them to obtain the original data.
This data storage scheme has several attractive features. Firstly, it provides reliability. The original data can be recovered with up to n ? k node failures. Secondly, it permits dynamic recon gurability and hot-swapping of components. We can dynamically remove and replace up to n ? k nodes. In addition, the exibility to choose any k out of n nodes permits load balancing. We can select the k nodes with the smallest load, or in the case of a wide-area network, the k nodes that are geographically closest.
Proof-of-Concept Applications
We present several applications implemented on the RAIN platform based on the fault management, communication, and data storage building blocks described in the preceding sections: a video server (RAINVideo), a web server (SNOW), and a distributed checkpointing system (RAINCheck).
High-Availability Video Server
There has been considerable research in the area of fault-tolerant Internet and multimedia servers. Examples are the SunSCALR project at Sun Microsystems 44] , as well as papers by Elnozahy 24] and Tobagi et al. 49 ].
For our RAINVideo application, a collection of videos are encoded and written to all n nodes in the system with distributed store operations. Each node runs a client application that attempts to display a video, as well as a server application that supplies encoded video data. For each block of video data, a client performs a distributed retrieve operation to obtain encoded symbols from k of the servers. It then decodes the block of video data and displays it. If we break network connections or take down nodes, some of the servers may no longer be accessible. However, the videos continue to run without interruption, provided that each client can access at least k servers. Snapshots of the demo are shown in Figures 7 and 8 . There are 10 computers, each with two Myrinet network interfaces, and four eight-way Myrinet network switches.
High-Availability Web Server
SNOW stands for Strong Network Of Webservers. It is a proof-of-concept project that demonstrates the features of the RAIN system. The goal is to develop a Highly Available Fault-Tolerant The SNOW project uses several key building blocks of the RAIN technology. Firstly, the reliable communication layer is used to handle all of the message passing between the servers in the SNOW system. Secondly, the token-based fault management module is used to establish the set of servers participating in the cluster. In addition, the token protocol is used to guarantee that when a request is received by SNOW, one and only one server will reply to the client. The latest information about the HTTP queue is attached to the token. Thirdly, the distributed storage module can be used to store the actual data for the web server.
Distributed Checkpointing Mechanism
The idea of using error-control codes for distributed checkpointing was proposed by Plank 40] . We have implemented a checkpoint and rollback/recovery mechanism on the RAIN platform based on the distributed store and retrieve operations. The scheme runs in conjunction with a leader election protocol, described in 29]. This protocol ensures that there is a unique node designated as leader in every connected set of nodes. The leader node assigns jobs to the other nodes. As each job executes, a checkpoint of its state is taken periodically. The state is encoded and written to all accessible nodes with a distributed store operation. If a node fails or becomes inaccessible, the leader assigns the node's jobs to other nodes. The encoded symbols for the state of each job are read from k nodes with a distributed read operation. The state of each job is then decoded 
Conclusions
The goal of the RAIN project has been to build a testbed for various building blocks that address fault-management, communication, and storage in a distributed environment. The creation of such building blocks is important for the development of a fully functional distributed computing system. One of the fundamental driving ideas behind this work has been to consolidate the assumptions required to get around the \di cult" parts of distributed computing into several basic building blocks. We feel the ability to provide basic, provably correct services is essential to building a real fault-tolerant system. In other words, the di cult proofs should be con ned to a few basic components of the system. Components of the system built on top of those reliable components should then be easier to develop and easier to establish as correct in their own right. Building blocks that we consider important and that are discussed in this paper are those providing reliable communication, group membership information, and reliable storage. Among the future and current directions of this work are:
Development of API's for using the various building blocks. We should standardize the packaging of the various components to make them more practical for use by outside groups.
A port of MPI onto the fault-tolerant communication layer. This would provide a standardized interface to a portion of the communication layer and would facilitate benchmarking this component.
The implementation of a real distributed le system using the data partitioning schemes developed here. In addition to making this building block more accessible to others, it would help in assessing the performance bene ts and penalties from partitioning data in such a manner.
We are currently benchmarking the system for general assessment of the performance of the algorithms and protocols developed in the project.
